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Abstract 
Purpose 
This paper examines the effect of managerial change in the English football industry. Our 
theoretical discussion covers three contrasting concepts that attempt to explain the association 
between manager change and organisational performance (scapegoating theory, vicious-circle 
theory and tenure and life-cycle theory).  
Design/Methodology/Approach 
Data was collected for the four main English Football Leagues between 2000/01 and 2015/16. 
A total of 2,816 football matches were included in the study. Analysis was conducted using 
relevant statistical techniques to examine the impact of managerial change on performance. 
Findings 
The results show significant differences in all four English Football Leagues when considering 
teams who make a managerial change and those who do not. Further analysis revealed that a 
managerial change is more beneficial for clubs in the bottom half of the league, particularly for 
the English Premier League. 
Originality/Value 
The implications for clubs competing in English football are clear when considering the 
strategic direction of the club in respect of managerial change and its impact on team 
performance. The results also have implications at policy level given the number of different 
stakeholders involved in the decision-making processes of football clubs and the results are of 
interest to all these groups. 
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Introduction 
Williams (2012) noted that sport, and professional sport leagues in particular, are unique in 
nature due to the fact that individual teams, while seeking a dominant position in a winner-
takes-all scenario, require competitors to provide opposition, entertainment and commercial 
possibility. As such, professional sport can be a lucrative business, presenting many 
opportunities for revenue generation (Madichie, 2009). However, generating revenue often 
necessitates a rise in cost, which is frequently in the form of player recruitment and salaries for 
professional sport teams, and with this comes an increasing pressure to deliver results with a 
degree of immediacy (Flint, Plumley and Wilson, 2016). 
In professional team sports such as football, this pressure falls mostly on one person, 
which is most often the manager. Indeed, it is widely regarded that the role of the football 
manager is one of chronic insecurity (e.g. Flint, Plumley and Wilson, 2014). Most organisations 
encounter changes in leadership at some point, but there is normally a natural time for such a 
change (de Dios Tena and Forrest, 2007). For example, a political party may change their leader 
following an unsuccessful election campaign, or a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) may be 
changed when a contract reaches a natural expiration point or when that person reaches a 
certain age. However, in the context of professional football, very few changes are the result 
of a natural process of time. There is some confusion regarding the differences between a leader 
of an organisation (in general business) and the manager of a football team (sport business) 
which is summarised perfectly by Hughes, Hughes, Mellahi and Guermat (2010). In their paper 
on the English football industry, they liken the football manager to a senior operating officer. 
An operating officer is typically a CEO's greatest asset; while CEO's focus on external and 
strategic activities, an operating officer focuses on internal operating matters, solves workplace 
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problems, detects early signs of marketplace change and nurtures talent (Hambrick and 
Cannella, 2004). From here on in, we use the term manager exclusively to denote the football 
manager in charge of team affairs.  
Our paper examines the effect of managerial change in the English Football League and 
provides two main contributions to theory. Firstly, our paper updates the work Audas, Dobson 
and Goddard (2002) and Hughes et al. (2010), both of whom offer longitudinal analysis on 
managerial change in the English Football League that stretches between the early 1970s to the 
early 2000s. Our data pertains to the English Football League since 2000 up to and including 
the 2015/16 seasons, hence updating the research in this field. Second, we discuss our results 
in the context of the theoretical frameworks for why managerial change occurs and offer 
insightful discussion as to whether or not any of the theories are relevant in relation to 
professional team sports. Practitioners also benefit from this research evidence by identifying 
the consequences of change and tracking the long-term performance of clubs in relation to 
managerial change. 
The remainder of our paper is structured as followed. The next section considers the 
theoretical framework present in managerial change literature before we consider the evidence 
base of managerial change research in professional team sports. Following this, we discuss the 
dataset for this paper and the analysis techniques performed which lead us to the results and 
discussion in relation to the theoretical framework. The final section concludes with 
recommendations for researchers and practitioners as well as outlining the limitations of the 
paper and future research direction.  
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Theoretical considerations of managerial change 
There is substantial academic coverage of manager change in both sports and general business 
organisations that inform our work. Whilst a comprehensive review of managerial change 
literature is beyond the scope of this paper there are a number of studies that provide more 
detailed coverage in this area (e.g. Giambatista, Rowe and  Riaz, 2005; Kesner and  Sebora, 
1994). Our theoretical discussion does cover three contrasting theories that attempt to explain 
the association between manager change and organisational performance (Hughes et al., 2010). 
This area of enquiry has been determined in part because of inconsistent findings in the field 
in relation to the effect that managerial change has on organisational performance (e.g. Greiner, 
Cummings and Bhambri, 2002). The first theory is labelled as scapegoating; managers are 
replaced as a ritual to signal that boards of directors have taken action to address poor 
performance. This is particularly pertinent in the professional football industry, where the fans 
of clubs and media outlets place increasing pressure on CEOs to make a change at managerial 
level when sporting results are perceived to be poor. However, Sakano and Lewin (1999) 
suggest that the scapegoating theory may not always resolve underlying organisational issues, 
building on the work of Khanna and Poulsen (1995) who find that managers are rarely to blame 
for poor performance as they do not deliberately make value-destroying decisions. In 
scapegoating theory, the loss of firm-specific knowledge can also act as a mechanism to 
explain why performance might not improve after manager change.  
The second theory is labelled vicious circle theory in a sense that manager change 
continually damages performance because replacement events disrupt already established 
processes and bring with it instabilities and tensions that can further deteriorate performance 
(Grusky, 1963). There is further evidence to support this theory from Greiner et al. (2002) who 
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state that the disruptive nature of manager change is exacerbated by the loss of firm-specific 
knowledge which further deteriorates performance in the short to medium term. 
Lastly, tenure and life-cycle theories suggest that a new manager develops new 
processes, a new team and a fresh strategy that will improve long-term performance through 
continual learning and identifying where adaptations are necessary (Hambrick and  Fukutomi, 
1991). Put simply, a new manager should be given time to change performance positively for 
the long term. Findings have indicated an association between giving more managers more 
time and better long-term performance as time is needed for managers to nurture, train and 
shape human capital (Giambatista, 2004; Rowe, Cannella, Rankin and  Gorman, 2005). 
However, other authors argue flaws in this theory suggesting that managers over time become 
dysfunctional in an inverted U-shaped relationship with performance (Hambrick and 
Fukutomi, 1991) and that some studies propose that organisational performance increases for 
the first 8-10 years of tenure but decreases thereafter as managers apply old formulae to new 
conditions (Miller and  Shamsie, 2001). In response, Henderson, Miller and Hambrick (2006) 
do suggest that this pattern might depend on the industry.  
Tenure and life-cycle theory is certainly a rare occurrence in English professional 
football. Indeed, of the current managers in English league football (at the time of writing) only 
2 managers out of 92 have been in charge of their present club for longer than 5 years (Arsene 
Wenger at Arsenal FC (English Premier League, 20 years in post) and Paul Tisdale at Exeter 
City FC (English Football League 2, 10 years in post). Furthermore, various media outlets in 
recent seasons have discussed the performance of Arsene Wenger in relation to the concept of 
tenure and life-cycle theory with the club being subjected to external pressure from fans having 
not won the league title since the 2003/2004 season. Indeed, a recent news article suggested 
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that Wenger has now begun to abandon his philosophy of how his team should play in an 
attempt to make them title challengers again (Kini, 2016). 
It is these three theories that form the basis for our discussion later on in the paper and 
we now turn our attention to previous research that examines managerial change in professional 
team sports. Koning (2003) stated that the choice of this industry is advantageous as objectives 
in football organisations are clearer than those of a conventional firm although this appears 
contentious given the modern-day football industry where football clubs must balance a myriad 
of multiple performance objectives (e.g. Carlsson-Wall, Kraus and  Messner, 2016). 
Notwithstanding this, managerial change research in professional team sports is useful as 
competing organisations possess similar structures, objectives and industry constraints (e.g. 
Audas et al., 2002). 
Previous research on managerial change in professional team sports 
Research examining managerial change in the sports industry is not new, with some of the 
extant literature dating back to the 1960s, with Grusky's (1963) research on dismissals in Major 
League Baseball (MLB) being one of the first in the field. However, the size, scale and shape 
of the industry itself has changed dramatically since this pioneering paper, with some of the 
most rapid acceleration in value taking place over the last two decades. This is particularly the 
case with English professional football, due primarily to the escalation of media rights deals, 
which has meant that football clubs are now increasingly concerned with their financial affairs 
(e.g. Morrow and Howieson, 2014). In addition to Grusky's work, a number of previous studies 
have focused on the major American team sports such as the National Basketball Association 
(NBA: Giambatista, 2004), National Hockey League (NHL: Rowe, Cannella, Rankin and 
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Gorman, 2005), Major League Baseball (MLB: McTeer, White, and  Persad, 1995) and the 
National Football League (NFL: Brown, 1982). 
After this, the majority of the extant literature is focused on European football leagues 
such as the EPL (e.g. Audas, Dobson and  Goddard, 2002; Bell, Brooks and  Markham, 2013; 
Flint, et al., 2014; Hope, 2003; Ogbonna and  Harris, 2014), Dutch Eredivisie (e.g. Bruinshoofd 
and  ter Weel, 2003; Koning, 2003; Van Ours and  Van Tuijl, 2016), German Bundesliga (e.g. 
Frick and  Simmons, 2008), Spanish La Liga (e.g. Gonzalez-Gomez et al., 2011; de Dios Tena 
and  Forrest, 2007) and Italian Serie A (e.g. De Paola and  Scoppa, 2011;). Despite such a 
substantial body of empirical evidence relating to managerial change, studies have reported 
mixed findings. Some have reported managerial change to have little or no effect on 
performance, particularly in relation to long-term performance. Indeed, the study by Grusky 
(1963) found a negative relationship between managerial change and performance that created 
a vicious circle of continual decline (i.e. poor performance triggers manager change which 
intensifies poor performance) which is one of the three main theories in relation to 
organisational change cited in the introduction. A number of studies point to an improvement 
in short term performance following a managerial change (e.g. Audas et al., 2002; Flint, et al., 
2014; Koning, 2003; Giambatista, 2004; Van Ours and  Van Tuijl, 2016) but all also stated that 
compared with a control group of clubs that did not change the manager clubs that changed 
still performed worse overall. These findings advocate the view of Rowe (2005) who suggested 
that giving managers more time leads to better performance in the NHL. Rowe and colleagues 
suggested that this occurs because new managers need time to lead organisational 
reconstruction and implement the right initiatives to achieve this goal which links closely to 
the tenure and life-cycle theory postulated by Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991). 
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It is reasonable to suggest that, in actual fact, the majority of club executives do 
subscribe to this mantra. More often than not, a change of manager midway through a season 
is a simply a reaction to a poor run of results and a short term decision rather than anything that 
has stemmed from poor planning in the first instance. Furthermore, in many cases, particularly 
in elite leagues, dismissing the manager can be a costly exercise as managers are entitled to 
compensation if their contracts are terminated early (Bell et al., 2013). There are a myriad of 
factors involved with the decision to replace a football manager. Indeed, Wagg (2005, 2007) 
argues that football management is a paradigm and that there is a long standing myth that a 
football clubs' performance is the product of the stewardship of one person: the manager. This 
subscribes to the scapegoat theory proposed by Sakano and Lewin (1999) where the modern-
day football industry creates a pressurised environment in which the default response to poor 
performance appears to be an almost automatic response to replace the football manager. There 
seems to be no logic or strategic thought as to the timing of this decision either, particularly 
within-season. 
Hope (2003) did attempt to develop a practical econometric solution to this problem 
and proposes three core factors with regard to managerial performance: 1) the honeymoon 
period (length of the honeymoon period in which a manager is exempt from being sacked); 2) 
the trapdoor (average number of points accumulated per game); 3) and the weight (the most 
recent games will be given significant weight in analysing the managers performance). Taking 
these factors into account, a manager would be sacked if they fall below the trap door figure. 
Using partial data from the EPL seasons 1996/97 to 2001/02, Hope's model (2003) suggested 
that in considering these factors a manager should gain an average of at least 0.74 points per 
game and 56.81 points over the course of the season to avoid being sacked by the club. 
However, in practice, this scenario rarely plays out and clubs have been known to change 
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managers at random points in time and for a number of different reasons. In any case, Hope's 
model is clearly still subjective with no emphasis on important variables such as whether games 
are played at home or away, the quality of the opposition, the importance of avoiding 
relegation, non-EPL games (e.g. cup competitions), the financial costs of firing a manager and 
the diverse aspirations of alternative clubs (Bell et al. 2013).  
It is clear from the literature that managerial changes are critical decisions that can 
shape organisational performance (Miller, 1991). The consequences of such change can have 
a significant impact on a football club, for example it can alleviate the threat of relegation and 
ultimately financial loss or the achievement of European qualification and an increase in 
revenue. As such, it is important that a number of measures are employed when considering 
whether or not managerial change is the correct decision to make. This paper, therefore, 
provides a new and unique insight into the effect of managerial change on the performance of 
football clubs in the modern-day English football industry (i.e. post-2000) by considering three 
main research questions: 1) does managerial change lead to an increase in points per game? 2) 
does managerial change increase points per game for clubs in the top and bottom half of the 
table? and, 3) does managerial change influence the league position of clubs in both the top 
and bottom half of the table. These research questions are answered through the examination 
of a substantial dataset that covers the four professional English Football Leagues, thus 
enabling the paper to contribute to the current body of research surrounding managerial change 
in professional team sports. The next section of the paper briefly discusses the methodological 
approach taken before the results are discussed in the context of the existing literature. 
Method 
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The methodology for this study follows a similar approach to Flint et al. (2014) in respect of 
the methods employed and subsequent analysis. As such, we see this study as a natural 
progression of this paper given that Flint et al. (2014) only considered one league (the EPL) 
over 10 years. Our data covers the period from 2000/01 to 2015/16 and focuses on the main 
four professional leagues in England (the EPL, The Championship, League 1 and League 2). 
Data was collected from the official websites pertaining to the English Premier League (EPL), 
English Football League (EFL) and the League Managers Association (LMA).  Throughout 
this time period, the EPL has consisted of 20 teams having been reduced from 22 in 1995. The 
three leagues below (Championship, League 1 and League 2) have all comprised of 24 teams 
each since the restructure of the football league in 1995. The composition of the leagues 
changes from year-to-year due to a promotion and relegation system being in place across all 
four leagues. Our study focuses solely on league performance and does not account for non-
league matches such as domestic or European cup competitions. 
The primary measures we use in this study to outline team performance is the total number of 
points obtained by a team during an entire season against the total number of matches played 
by any given team. During a season, the variable for league points is strictly non-decreasing 
(excluding extraordinary penalties by the Football Association). This allows us to consider the 
average points per match obtained by each manager at any given time. The average points per 
match of those clubs that have experienced managerial change during the last sixteen years 
were analysed. We also used league position as an additional proxy to measure sporting 
success. This is due to the fact that the league points obtained contributes to a ranking position 
for any club in any given league which can then lead to additional success (or failure) factors 
such as additional prize money, qualification for European competition or, on a negative note, 
relegation to the league below. 
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Data analysis 
Independent t-tests were conducted to examine whether teams who make a managerial change 
accumulate more points than teams who stick with their manager, and paired t-tests were used 
to examine points per game and league position changed from pre to post managerial change. 
To examine the impact of managerial change on league position, the difference between 
league position at the point of managerial change and the final league position was calculated.  
Independent t-tests were conducted to examine the difference in change in league position 
between teams in the top half of each league compared to the bottom half.  
Repeated measures one-way ANOVAs with Bonferroni correction for confidence interval 
adjustment and follow up post-hoc tests with Scheffé correction were used to examine any 
differences between Points Per Game pre- to post-managerial change for teams in the top or 
bottom half each league. Follow up paired t-tests were conducted where significant differences 
were identified.  
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Over the 15 seasons, the most managerial changes occurred in the EFL 2, Championship, EFL 
1 followed by the EPL (43.6%, 39.1%, 34.7%, 27.2% of managers were changed, respectively; 
see Table 1).   
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[Table 1 about here] 
In all four leagues, more teams in the bottom half made a managerial change than in the top 
half over the 15 seasons. In all leagues, teams who made a managerial change on average 
improved their league position more than teams who made a change in the top half, and in the 
EPL and Championship, managerial change led to a deterioration in league position on average 
than teams in the top half (see Table 2). 
[Table 2 about here]: 
Does managerial change increase Points Per Game? 
Significant differences were observed in all four leagues between the Points Per Game 
accumulated by teams who make a managerial change compared to those who do not, where 
teams who do not make a managerial change accumulate more Points Per Game than teams 
who do make a change (t(318) = 6.80, P < .01; t(382) = 11.97, P < .01; t(382) = 5.17, P < .01; 
t(382) = 4.79, P < .01, for the EPL, Championship, EFL 1 and EFL 2 respectively).   
In respect of the difference in points per game accumulated pre compared to post 
managerial change, significant differences were observed in the EFL1, where in both instances, 
increased points per game was observed after a managerial change (t(132) = -4.87, P <.001). 
No significant differences were observed for the EPL, Championship or EFL2 (t(86) = -1.92, 
P >.05; t(149) = 1.25, P >.05; t(154) = -.47, P >.05, respectively). 
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Change in league position between teams in the top half of each league compared to the 
bottom half 
A significant difference between the change in league position between top and bottom half 
teams in the Championship and EFL2 were identified (t(148) = -2.94, P <.01; t(153) = -3.68, 
P <.001, respectively). There were no significant differences between the change in league 
position between top and bottom half teams in the EPL and EFL1 (t(85) = -1.83, P >.05; t(131) 
= -1.91, P >.05, respectively).  
Points per game for teams with a managerial change in the top versus bottom half of the 
league 
Significant main effects were evident for Points Per Game accumulated by teams who made a 
managerial change in either the top or bottom of half of the league when comparing Points Per 
Game accumulated pre versus post managerial change in the Championship and EFL 1 (F(1, 
30) = 10.29, P < .01, 
2
p  = .26; F(1, 30) = 4.76, P < .05, 
2
p = .14, respectively). Follow up 
paired t-test revealed significant differences in points per game accumulated by teams in the 
top half compared to the bottom half in the EFL1 (t(42.44) = 4.14, P < .001), where oppositely, 
teams in the top half who made a managerial change accumulated more points per game 
compared to teams in the bottom half. Follow up paired t-test revealed that there was no 
significant difference in points per game accumulated by top or bottom half teams in the 
Championship (t(34.34) = -1.01, P > .05).  
A significant interaction between Points Per Game and whether a team was in the top 
or bottom half of the EPL was evident, where teams in the top half of the EPL who made a 
change accumulate less Points Per Game after managerial change compared to teams in the 
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bottom half who accumulated more Points Per Game (F(1, 85) = 10.25, P < .01, 
2
p = .11, see 
Figure 1). 
[Figure 1 about here] 
No main effects were evident for the EPL or EFL 2 (F(1, 85) = 0.57, P > .05, 
2
p = .00; 
F(1, 29) = 2.44, P > .05, 
2
p  = .08, respectively). No interaction effects were observed for 
Points Per Game and whether a team was in the top or bottom half of the Championship, EFL 
1 and EFL 2 (F(1, 30) = 0.08, P > .05, 
2
p = .00; F(1, 30) = .27, P > .05, 
2
p  = .01; F(1, 30) = 
.27, P > .05, 
2
p = .01, respectively).
Discussion 
Based on table 1, the assertion that the role of a football manager is one of chronic insecurity 
(e.g. Flint, Plumley and Wilson, 2014) is confirmed. The total number of manager changes was 
525 for the period studies across all four leagues with an average number of changes per season 
standing at 32.8. In relation to individual leagues, the average number of changes per season 
equated to 5.4 (EPL), 9.4 (Championship), 8.3 (EFL 1) and 9.7 (EPL 2). Despite the rewards 
on offer in the EPL it seems a manager's job is rather more secure. 
The most managerial changes were made in EFL 2, with the least number of changes 
being made in the EPL (see table 1). This is perhaps surprising given the point of Morrow and 
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Howieson (2014) that owing to the escalation of media broadcasting rights English football 
clubs, and in particular EPL clubs, are more concerned with financial affairs. The amount of 
revenue on offer to EPL clubs is significantly higher than their counterparts in the football 
league. Indeed, in relation to EFL 2 the payment each club receives from central broadcasting 
distributions is around £600,000 whereas the broadcasting revenue guaranteed for the club that 
finishes bottom of the EPL is around £100m. As such, it is reasonable to assume that the 
financial pressure on managers in the EPL is greater than managers in the rest of the English 
Football Leagues although are results state that more managerial changes occur in these leagues 
than in the EPL. An alternative discussion point is that perhaps EPL managers are protected 
somewhat by the leagues financial climate, providing they maintain league status as a minimum 
requirement. For example, consider a mid-table EPL team that has very little chance of 
qualifying for European competitions but, equally, has very little chance of being relegated. In 
this instance, the owner might be satisfied to maintain the same level of performance as 
realistically performance could not get much better without significant further investment. 
Relegation, on the other hand, has severe financial consequences and this could be one of the 
reasons why a high number of clubs make the decision to change the manager when threatened 
with relegation.  
This argument is confirmed by our findings. In the EPL, teams in the top half of the 
table who made a change accumulate less Points Per Game after managerial change compared 
to teams in the bottom half who accumulated more Points Per Game. In this regard, our findings 
are in line with the work of Flint et al. (2014) who confirmed similar findings for the EPL. This 
is particularly relevant given the financial context of relegation from the EPL, notwithstanding 
the cost of hiring and firing a manager (see Flint, Plumley and Wilson, 2016), which can 
immediately cost a club around £60m in revenue. With this in mind, our results show that if a 
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club is threatened with relegation from the EPL then it might be beneficial to consider changing 
a manager to secure a short-term improvement in performance. This should be done in enough 
time for it to make a difference to playing performance (ideally around the midway point in the 
season).  
In addition to this, our results concur with several studies in the extant literature that 
point to an improvement in short term performance following a managerial change (e.g. Audas 
et al., 2002; Flint, et al., 2014; Koning, 2003; Giambatista, 2004; Van Ours and  Van Tuijl, 
2016). Our findings also confirm (as stated in the above studies) that compared with a control 
group of clubs that did not change the manager clubs that changed still performed worse 
overall. Similar findings were confirmed by Rowe (2005) in the NHL who suggested that 
giving managers more time leads to better performance. Rowe and colleagues suggested that 
this occurs because new managers need time to lead organisational reconstruction and 
implement the right initiatives to achieve this goal which links closely to the tenure and life-
cycle theory postulated by Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991). 
Reflecting on the theoretical position 
Our results appear to subscribe to the argument that in the English professional football 
industry there is a prevalence of the theories of scapegoating and vicious circle rather than the 
tenure and life-cycle, perhaps more often found in US team sports where a manager is fired, or 
doesn't receive a contract renewal, at the end of a season. However, we must also be cautious 
in our findings with reference to these theories. We have not controlled for a number of 
scenarios that might also be associated with managerial change that are distinct from on-pitch 
performance. Notwithstanding this, our results do provide a starting point for future research 
in this area that could look to include multi-level modelling. Our results are particularly 
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important when considering the point at which a manager change is made in professional 
football, often at random points within season. For instance, the number of managerial changes 
in total may point towards evidence of scapegoating (i.e. it is the managers performance that 
has contributed to a low points per match return) whilst the lack of significance in improvement 
in performance post-managerial change (in general terms for the majority of leagues) and 
subsequent continual changes of manager may subscribe to vicious circle theory. It could well 
be that both theories apply rather than one or the other.  
Furthermore, these findings also provide some association with scapegoat theory 
(Sakano and Lewin, 1999) in relation to the modern-day football industry which creates a 
pressurised environment in which the default response to poor performance appears to be an 
almost automatic response to replace the football manager. The external pressure placed on 
boards by supporters, players and the media provides a melting pot which appears to result in 
knee-jerk reaction. Particularly when it is found that a manager who stays will return higher 
points per match return over time than those who are regularly changed. There seems to be no 
logic or strategic thought as to the timing of this decision either, particularly when it occurs 
within-season and importantly, the clubs overall objectives appear to be ignored. 
In this regard, it could be argued that the work of Hope (2003), who postulated a model to 
establish the right time to sack a manager, is virtually impossible given the volatile nature of 
the industry and the suggestion that there seems to be no strategic thought about the timing of 
the decision. Indeed, there are other variables that will impact on a managerial change decision, 
and make models such as Hope's appear simplistic, such as pressure from other stakeholder 
groups (e.g. fans), changes in the external environment and/or a breakdown in communication 
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between manager and owner to name but a few. This requires refinement and a qualitative 
discussion with Directors to establish a full picture of the rationale behind managerial sacking. 
Managerial change; Improving performance? 
The findings of this study suggest to football club boards that, whilst managerial change can 
often improve performance in the short-term, in general there is little statistical evidence that 
sacking a manager has any real effect in terms of post-managerial change performance. Indeed, 
with reference to general performance pre and post-managerial change there are significant 
findings in the case of EFL 1 but no significant difference for other leagues. Consequently, our 
findings report mixed results for all four leagues studied although there is an important 
implication for clubs in the bottom half of the EPL. Here, our results indicate that a change in 
manager does significantly improve performance and this is important in the context of this 
league whereby the financial rewards for survival are great. The results of the current study 
should be beneficial for club stakeholders when considering managerial change and can be 
informative for analysts, with debates common over whether managerial change is the correct 
decision. Given the different factors that need to be considered and the potential implications 
of managerial change for clubs in the top and bottom half as alluded to above, the findings of 
this paper provide new insights that should be taken into account when making decisions about 
managerial change. For example, the pressure on clubs to remain in the EPL, given the financial 
benefits, is often cited as the reason for changing a manager and this factor is supported in the 
findings of this paper. 
Limitations and future research 
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There were four potential shortcomings of the study. First the timing of change was not 
considered (i.e. whether the change was made at the start or end of the season), which may 
have affected the amount of pressure a club may have been experiencing (e.g. relegation 
threatened). Timing of change was not considered due to the varied factors evident at different 
time points within a given season such as the results achieved in cup competitions and allowing 
new managers sufficient opportunity to work with players in alignment with Hope's (2003) 
definition of the 'honeymoon period'. However, the current study uses a standardised measure 
of points gained per match to account for these factors. Second, the amount of games each 
manager had accumulated varied which might have affected the points per match achieved. For 
instance, based on the premise that clubs receive a short-term benefit from managerial change 
(Bruinshoofd and ter Weel., 2003; McTeer et al., 1995), if a club changed their manager after 
30 out of 38 matches, it is expected that more points per match would be achieved in the final 
8 matches. Third, we have not considered the impact of other externalities in this study that 
may have an impact on managerial change such as the spending on player transfer fees and 
salaries. The intention of this study was to isolate the direct impact of points per match and 
league position linked to managerial change. Fourth, we have not applied a multi-level 
approach to the analysis which would help control for team fixed effects and the clustering of 
matches per season. Thus, we appreciate that we cannot claim direct causality in respect of our 
findings and managerial change. Indeed, it may not be surprising to observe that teams in the 
bottom half of the table made more managerial changes than those in the top half and we have 
not been able to control for the quality of the opponents given that teams are at the mercy of 
the league organisers in respect of the calendar schedule. To achieve a more accurate measure 
of the manager effect it would necessary for the analysis to allow for randomness of results and 
control for other external factors such as opponent quality.  
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With regards to future research, a more comprehensive examination of the impacts of 
managerial change in the English football industry is warranted that considers the effects 
beyond points per match and final league position that were included in the current study. In 
particular we would look to control for external factors and specifically the quality of 
opponents. It would also be beneficial for future research to consider more qualitative factors 
as part of any analysis such as fans perceptions of the manager, the relationship between 
manager and owner and the structure of the management team at boardroom level. Whilst such 
variables are understandably difficult to measure, they may have a direct or indirect impact on 
the decision taken to change a manager and are thus important when considering a more holistic 
approach to investigating this field of study. Wagg (2005, 2007) argued that football 
management is a paradigm and that there is a long standing myth that a football clubs' 
performance is the product of the stewardship of one person. Consequently, it is important that 
future research in the field incorporates more variables and the wider picture of the football 
industry and club ownership. 
Conclusion 
This paper provides empirical evidence on the impact of managerial change on team 
performance for the four professional leagues in England. In doing so, it provides a longitudinal 
and comparative analysis that updates the current literature in the field. In relation to our three 
research questions, we present mixed evidence. There are instances where managerial change 
improves performance within certain leagues and depending on league position at the time of 
change but there are also instances where no significant difference is found in relation to 
performance post-managerial change. There appears to be no symmetry between leagues in 
relation to the findings of this study. As such, it is important that the relevant decision makers 
at each club consider a more holistic approach to changing a manager and that they do not 
22 
solely focus on indicators such as points per game, while being mindful that statistically 
speaking clubs that opted for a new manager within this study appear to have acted wisely. 
This paper explores the differences that exist between leagues when it comes to the frequency 
and effect of managerial change highlighting the short-term nature of managerial tenure 
particularly if you are a manager in the lowest tier of the professional pyramid.  
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Table 1: Mean and standard deviation of managerial changes, points per game and league 
position change in the 4 English Football Leagues (2000/01-2015/16 seasons) 
EPL Championship EFL 1 EFL 2 
Managerial changes (n) 87 150 133 155 
Points per game of teams that made a 
managerial Change 
1.46 
(.43) 
1.46 
(.31) 
1.35 
(.42) 
1.47 
(.31) 
Points per game of teams that did not 
make a managerial Change 
1.08 
(.49) 
1.04 
(.38) 
1.12 
(.40) 
1.09 
(.40) 
Difference in league position change of 
teams that made a managerial change 
.89 
(3.39) 
1.55 
(5.01) 
1.27 
(4.45) 
1.20 
(4.00) 
Table 2: Mean and standard deviation of managerial changes, points per game and league 
position change for teams in the top and bottom half of the 4 English Football Leagues 
(2000/01-2015/16 seasons) 
EPL Championship EFL 1 EFL 2 
T B T B T B T B 
Managerial changes (n) 18 69 32 118 33 100 34 121 
Points per game 1.47 
(.57) 
1.11 
(.42) 
.87 
(2.25) 
1.28 
(.99) 
1.65 
(.53) 
.1.23 
(.37) 
-.95 
(3.27) 
1.81 
(4.00) 
Difference in league 
position change of teams 
that made a managerial 
change 
-.39 
(2.70) 
1.23 
(3.48) 
-.70 
(4.53) 
2.16 
(4.97) 
.00 
(4.49) 
1.69 
(4.38) 
.91 
(2.95) 
1.20 
(1.05) 
*T = Top half of the league when managerial change occurred; B = Bottom half of the league
when managerial change occurred 
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Figure 1: Points Per Game accumulated by top and bottom half teams pre and post managerial 
change I the EPL 
